Add security and regulatory mapping page

znetsixe
2026-03-23 11:46:03 +01:00
parent 88d862172d
commit 5bb738854d
3 changed files with 61 additions and 0 deletions

@@ -115,3 +115,7 @@ Actual compliance still depends on:
## Operational Constraint ## Operational Constraint
Central guidance should remain advisory-first. Local site and edge layers must still behave safely when central is degraded or unavailable. Central guidance should remain advisory-first. Local site and edge layers must still behave safely when central is degraded or unavailable.
## Related Page
- [Security and Regulatory Mapping](Architecture-Security-and-Regulatory-Mapping)

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
# EVOLV Security and Regulatory Mapping
This page maps major security and resilience requirement areas to the EVOLV architecture direction.
It is intended to help explain to reviewers how EVOLV can be deployed to satisfy strict requirements, while staying explicit that compliance depends on implementation and operations as well as architecture.
## Primary Sources
- NIS2: Directive (EU) 2022/2555
- CER: Directive (EU) 2022/2557
- Cyber Resilience Act: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847
- GDPR: Regulation (EU) 2016/679
Official texts:
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj
## Mapping Table
| Requirement Area | Regulatory Context | EVOLV Architecture Response | Current Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| OT/IT segmentation | NIS2, CER, Purdue-aligned industry practice | External integrations terminate centrally; field edge is not the public integration surface; site and edge remain behind mediated layers. | Architecture defined, deployment enforcement depends on implementation. |
| Resilience during central outage | CER, NIS2 | Local and site layers retain Node-RED execution and local InfluxDB access so operation and monitoring can continue during central disruption. | Architecture defined, per-site operating procedures still required. |
| Controlled external access | NIS2, GDPR | Central API gateway acts as the entry point; central auth and policy checks mediate requests downward. | Architecture defined, gateway and IAM rollout maturity may vary by deployment. |
| Identity and authorization | NIS2, GDPR, CRA | Central IAM and policy enforcement are treated as platform services rather than ad hoc runtime behavior at the edge. | Target-state architecture; implementation maturity not yet uniform. |
| Secure configuration handling | NIS2, CRA | `tagcodering` is the intended configuration backbone; tracked manifests should use environment variables or secret injection rather than hard-coded credentials. | Direction established; config backbone and secret-handling rollout still in progress. |
| Vulnerability and update management | CRA, NIS2 | Central source control, CI/CD, and release traceability support controlled updates and evidence of change. | Core tooling exists in architecture direction; operating process must be maintained. |
| Logging and auditability | NIS2, GDPR, CER | Central ingress and layered mediation make it easier to define logging and audit boundaries; local/site layers can retain operational evidence. | Partly architectural, partly operational; needs explicit logging policy per deployment. |
| Data minimization and boundary control | GDPR | Centralized ingress and layered architecture reduce unnecessary spread of sensitive data into lower operational layers. | Architecture supports this; actual data classification and retention rules remain deployment-specific. |
| Product cybersecurity lifecycle | CRA | EVOLV treats release, patching, security boundaries, and configuration ownership as platform concerns rather than one-off flow edits. | Direction established; lifecycle evidence depends on maintained process. |
| Business continuity / degraded mode | CER, NIS2 | Edge-first and site-mediated runtime design avoids full dependency on one central runtime for essential service continuity. | Strong architecture fit; continuity plans and tests still required. |
## What Reviewers Can Be Told
The safe statement is:
- EVOLV is architected so it can be deployed in alignment with strict European cybersecurity and resilience expectations.
The unsafe statement is:
- EVOLV is automatically compliant by architecture alone.
## Evidence Expectations
To move from architecture alignment to demonstrable compliance, deployments should be able to show:
- network segmentation and access-control design
- IAM and authorization configuration
- patch and vulnerability-management process
- logging and incident-response process
- backup and recovery approach
- data-classification and retention policy
- evidence of how local, site, and central layers behave during outages

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ Architecture pages:
- [Platform Overview](Architecture-Platform-Overview) - [Platform Overview](Architecture-Platform-Overview)
- [Telemetry and Smart Storage](Architecture-Telemetry-and-Smart-Storage) - [Telemetry and Smart Storage](Architecture-Telemetry-and-Smart-Storage)
- [Security and Access Boundaries](Architecture-Security-and-Access-Boundaries) - [Security and Access Boundaries](Architecture-Security-and-Access-Boundaries)
- [Security and Regulatory Mapping](Architecture-Security-and-Regulatory-Mapping)
- [Configuration Model and Tagcodering](Architecture-Configuration-Model-and-Tagcodering) - [Configuration Model and Tagcodering](Architecture-Configuration-Model-and-Tagcodering)
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